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Casenotes
STATE CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manujacturing Co.'
Griffin v. McCoach 2
In the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware respondent, a New York corporation that had
transferred all its assets to the petitioning Delaware com-
pany, instituted this action in the belief that the latter had
failed to perform its part of the New York-executed con-
tract of transfer. The basis of the jurisdiction of the
Court was diversity of citizenship. At the successful
termination of its suit respondent invoked Section 480 of
the New York Civil Practice Act,' moving to correct its
judgment by the addition of interest at 6% from the date
of the institution of the action. The Court granted this
motion4 and on appeal its ruling was affirmed by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.' The lower
courts reached this result without reference to how the
state courts of Delaware would have resolved the conflict
of laws question involved. The recurrent appearance of
the question "whether in diversity cases the Federal courts
must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states
in which they sit",6 plus the appearance of a dissimilarity
in the routes by which the Third and First Circuits 7 ap-
proached the problem, induced the Supreme Court to grant
1313 U. S. 487 (1941).
-313 U. S. 498 (1941).
S". . . In every action wherein any sum of money shall be awarded by
verdict, report or decision upon a cause of action for the enforcement of
or based upon breach of performance of a contract, express or implied,
interest shall be recovered upon the principal sum whether theretofore
liquidated or unliquidated and shall be added to and be a part of the total
sum awarded."
' Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Klaxon Co., 30 F. Supp. 425
(D. C. Del., 1939).
5 115 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940). Shortly after Its disposition of
the Klaxon case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit seems
to have changed its approach in recognition of the impact of the Tompkins
decision upon conflict of laws. See Waggaman v. General Finance Co.,
116 F. (2d) 254, 257 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940).
o Supra, n. 1, 494.
T See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
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certiorari. On June 2, 1941, the Court reversed the judg-
ment below and remanded the case for discovery of and
decision in conformity with the conflict of laws rule of
Delaware, thus smashing a conflict of laws relic of Swift v.
Tyson.'
The rule of the Klaxon case was confirmed by Griffin v.
McCoach. In an interpleader ° brought in a United States
District Court in Texas the proceeds of an insurance policy
on the life of a Texan were claimed on the one hand by his
estate, and on the other, by the named beneficiary. In
derogation of the beneficiary's claim it was contended that
some of the parties" for whom he was acting as trustee,
had no insurable interest in the life of the insured as re-
quired by Texas law;' 2 that the forum should apply the law
of that state since the agreement whereby he was named
beneficiary was a Texas contract; 3 and that if it should
be determined that the whole transaction was governed
by the law of a state unopposed to recovery of insurance
proceeds by persons without insurable interests, the forum
was bound by the public policy of Texas against granting
such recovery. Affirming the judgment for the bene-
ficiary,'4 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
declared that since the subsequent changes in the policy
were made pursuant to the original New York contract,
the governing law was still that of New York; and "to
apply the laws of Texas to the New York contracts would
constitute an unwarranted extra-territorial control of con-
s 16 Pet. 1 (1842). See infra circa, notes 20-23.
9 This companion-piece to the Klaxon case was decided the same day as
the latter; Mr. Justice Reed, as in the Klaxon case, wrote the opinion.
1.As the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 41 (26), makes
diversity of citizenship on the part of the claimants a condition to the
vesting of jurisdiction in the district courts, the jurisdictional background
of the Klaxon case is not essentially dissimilar to that of Griffin v. Mc-
Coach.
11 The original beneficiary had been a New York syndicate composed of
seven investors who, to protect their advances to the Texan, had purchased
the policy and paid the premiums. By an agreement effected on his part
in Texas, the insured obtained for his wife an eighth interest in the pro-
ceeds of the policy, in return for his release of the right to any further
change of beneficiary. By the same agreement McCoach as trustee for
the members of the syndicate, was named beneficiary. Subsequently
three of the syndicate-members in New York assigned their interests in the
policy to others, strangers to the insured; it was the right of these as-
signees to recover that the estate contested.
2 See Wilke v. Finn, 39 S. W. (2d) 836, 838 (Tex., 1931) and cases
there cited.
" It was conceded that the original policy was controlled by the law of
New York, since the insured had applied for the policy there and it had
been delivered in that state.
1 116 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
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tracts and regulation of business outside of Texas in disre-
gard of the laws of New York . . ."' Having granted
certiorari for the same reasons as in the Klaxon case, the
Supreme Court held that whether the insurance policy as
altered was controlled by the law of New York or Texas,
and whether in any event Texas public policy permitted
recovery by a beneficiary without an insurable interest,
were questions to be determined by reference to the Texas
decisions.
Solely as a matter of case authority and text comment
in the field of conflict of laws it can be said that in the
Klaxon case both courts below made a proper choice of
law in their application of that of New York.16 The error
of their ways, however, lay in their inattention to the Dela-
ware conflict of laws rule. Of Griffin v. McCoach, sub-
stantially the same can be said.17  As far as one can learn
from the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, there
"Supra, n. 14, 264.
l Relying on 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1259, to the effect that
"in the absence of specific language, or of circumstances indicating a con-
trary intention, a contract is to be performed, in most cases, at the place
of contracting ... ", as well as RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 355,
Comment a: "... if the place of performance is not stated in specific
words in the contract, it must be determined by construction and inter-
pretation . . .", the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that
New York was the place of performance, by the laws of which place, of
course, the measure of damages for breach of contract is determined
(RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 413). In addition, this Court ad-
verted to Sec. 418 of the Restatement; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d
Ed., 1938) 215; and 2 BEA.LE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1335, for support
of the proposition that the law of the place of performance determines the
rate of interest allowed as part of the damages for breach of contract.
The District Court had reached the same result by a less academic jour-
ney; it merely followed the Federal courts' conflict of laws decisions
rendered independently of state decision as a matter of so-called "general
law". See Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190
(1894), and other cases mentioned at 30 F. Supp. 433 and 434.
17 The Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924), for its proposition that changes made in
an insurance policy pursuant to policy clauses providing therefor, do not
constitute new contracts or change the governing law applicable to the
policy. In support of its public policy conclusion the Court cited Overby
v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214 (1900); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head,
234 U. S. 149 (1914) ; Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 (1917) ; and Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Dunken, supra. For additional Supreme Court decisions
on both sides of the perplexing public policy question see Union Trust Co.
v. Grossman, 245 U. S. 412 (1918); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275
U. S. 274 (1927) ; Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission of California, 294 U. S. 532 (1935) ; Bradford Electric Light Co.,
Inc., v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932) ; Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934) ; Home Insurance Co.
v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930); and New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge,
246 U. S. 357 (1918).
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was no actual development of the Texas conflict of laws
rules; and for that purpose, the case was remanded with
the observation that a denial of recovery under those
rules would be constitutional in the instant case. The de-
fect in both cases was that the lower courts applied their
own conflict of laws ideas-right or wrong-without reck-
oning with the far-reaching effect of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins.'8
It was Erie Railroad v. Tompkins which largely de-
stroyed the Federal courts' independence of decision in
common law matters arising in diversity cases. In this
case, a majority of the Supreme Court announced that Mr.
Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson had been wrong in his
contention that when the Judiciary Act provided that "the
laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply","0 it did not em-
brace within the term "laws" the decisions of the state
courts in common law matters. Moreover, Congress was
declared powerless to formulate substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a state; and, the Federal judiciary,
it was said, had been pursuing an unconstitutional course
in applying its rules of "general law" in diversity cases.
However, as the Federal courts under the Tompkins
case had to defer to state courts' rules of decision only in
cases where they applied, there was always a possibility
that in a conflict of laws case a Federal court, deeming in-
applicable the law of the state where it sat, might feel free
to disregard it and make its own choice of law in the man-
ner of pre-Tompkins judges. 0 The Supreme Court had
left expressly unanswered the question whether the doc-
trine of the Tompkins case extended to the field of conflict
of laws.2' Writers were in sharp disagreement on the sub-
ject when the instant decisions resolved the conflict in
18 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
10 Section 34. See 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 725. Italics supplied.
20 Ex Parte Heidelback, 11 Fed. Cas. 1021, 1022 (D. C. Mass., 1876)
states that "the law of bills of exchange is part of general commercial
jurisprudence, and not of local law or usage . . . and so is any question
of the conflict of laws. When we have ascertained what local law applies
to the case, we follow it; but the ascertainment itself is not a local ques-
tion." To the same effect are Boseman v. Connecticut General Life In-
surance Co., 301 U. S. 196 (1937) ; Citizens National Bank v. Waugh, 78
F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Dygert v. Vermont Loan and Trust Co.,
94 F. 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1899).
'1 Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 304 U. S. 202, 208 (1938),
decided shortly after the Tompkins case.
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accord with a decision of the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.12
In this latter case, Sampson v. Channell,23 a Massachu-
setts Federal Court was confronted with a choice of law
on the burden of proof of contributory negligence in a
diversity case arising out of an accident in Maine. The
local rules on burden of proof differed in Massachusetts
and Maine. The Circuit Court of Appeals, observing that
burden of proof had been characterized differently accord-
ing to the purpose of classification,24 decided that for pur-
poses of application of the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins, 25 burden of proof was a substantive and not a pro-
cedural matter,26 and therefore the state rule of conflict of
laws of Massachusetts should apply. Then referring to the
Massachusetts' conflict of laws rule,27 and -finding that it
treated questions of burden of proof as procedural, the
Court applied the local Massachusetts rule on burden of
proof, rather than that of Maine where the accident oc-
curred. The Court conceded that in its ratiocination there
was a "surface incongruity, viz., the deference owing to the
substantive law of Massachusetts as pronounced by its
courts requires the Federal court in that state to apply a
Massachusetts rule as to burden of proof which the high-
est state court insists is procedural only". 2 This, however,
was necessary to promote the controlling policy of the
Tompkins' decision by reaching the result a Massachusetts
state court would have reached.
2 See Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws (1941) 89 U. of
Pa. L. R. 430, 446; McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of General Law
in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 II. L. R. 126, 138; note (1939) 52 Harv.
L. R. 1002, 1007.
"127 F. Supp. 213 (D. C. D. Mass., 1939) ; vacated 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1940) ; discussed in (1940) 20 B. U. L. Rev. 566; (1941) 29 Calif.
L. Rev. 228; (1940) 53 Harv. L. R. 1393; (1941) 25 Minn. L. Rev. 518;
(1940) 18 N. Y. L. Q. Rev. 119; (1940) 7 Ohio St. L. J. 59; (1940) 88 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 1010; and (1940) 27 Va. L. Rev. 120.
2 See Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 42
Yale L. J. 333, 337.
25 Note that this determination was made independently of reference to
state law. In Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (D. C. D. Ill., 1938)
the Illinois District Court had seemed to say that in the characterization
of burden of proof even for purposes of application of the Tompkins deci-
sion, the Federal courts were bound by the decisions of the courts of the
states in which they sat.
26 The Tompkins case requires conformity to local decisions in substantive
matters non-Federal in nature. At least so far as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have been promulgated, there is no necessity for the pro-
cedural conformity of the days of the Conformity Act.
27 Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600 (124 N. E. 477 (1919) ; Smith v. Brown,
302 Mass. 432, 19 N. E. (2d) 732 (1939).
28s upra, n. 7, 762.
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In following the approach of Sampson v. Channell the
Supreme Court was treading theoretically and practically
firm ground.29 The rules of conflict of laws are no less sub-
stantively a part of a state's common law than are those
of contracts and torts.30 And, under the doctrine of the
Tompkins case, "Congress has no power to declare substan-
tive rules of common law applicable in a state . . . And
no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts. '31  Of course, the practical
motivation of the decision was the fact that if Federal
courts need not respect local rules of conflict of laws, "the
ghost of Swift v. Tyson still walks abroad, somewhat
shrunken in size, yet capable of much mischief" 2 with its
lack of decisional uniformity within a state and the uncer-
tainties and resort to legal artifices consequent thereon.3
Moreover, it would seem that if Swift v. Tyson was condi-
tioned upon an unitary conception of the common law,3 4 it
would be particularly in the field of conflict of laws, where
such a conception is impugned by the very nature of the
subject, that the soundness of the rule of Swift v. Tyson
would be challengeable.
A probable consequence of conformity of federal and
state rules of conflict of laws is an increase in emphasis
on the impingement of this subject upon constitutional
law.3 Now that the avenue of federal "general law" has
2 The Court, it should be remarked, buttressed its "general considera-
tions" on the Tompkins case and conflict of laws with the observation that
"the traditional treatment of interest in diversity cases brought in the
federal courts points to the same conclusion." Supra, n. 1, 497.
20 See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d Ed., 1938) Sec. 6; RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 5; and 1 BALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935), Sec. 5.
3.
8' Supra, n. 18, 78. For comment on the meaning of Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, see Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 Yale L. J.
1336, 1344.
11 Supra, n. 7, 761.
" See the celebrated Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518 (1928).
34 See McCormick and Hewins, supra, n. 22, 128, where it is suggested
that the Federal courts' independence of state courts' decisions on the
common law was more acceptable to an era when Bench and Bar, forced
to rely on Supreme Court and English decisions through the relative
paucity and slimness of state reports, were more accustomed to think of
the common law as "a transcendental body of law", as "one august
corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court con-
cerned." See Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Black and White Taxicab Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.. 8upra, n. 33, 533.
35 See Ross, Has the Conflict of Law8 Become a Branch of Constitutional
Law? (1930) 15 Minn. L. R. 161; and Dodd, The Power of the Suprene
Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926)
39 Harv. L. R. 533.
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been closed to the litigant hoping to escape a state conflict
of laws rule,86 there might be a considerable intensification
of effort to show that the state choice of law violates either
the due process or full faith and credit provisions of the
Federal Constitution.37 And it is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that the District Courts, accustomed to independence
and impartiality in conflict of laws, will be astute to dis-
cern a constitutional problem in the application of a paro-
chial choice of law.
If, faced with the necessity of solving numerous con-
flicts problems, the Supreme Court should take the posi-
tion advocated by some legal writers,88 perhaps that ideal
of national decisional uniformity which Swift v. Tyson
failed to realize, and which the Tompkins decision dis-
carded in favor of one of intra-state uniformity, might be
attainable in the field of conflict of laws through the use of
constitutional devices s.3  However, the discussion in the
instant cases of the constitutionality of the possible con-
flict of laws rules of the states involved indicates no pres-
ent intention on the part of the Court to recognize full
faith and credit or due process objections to any state's
freedom of choice of its own conflict of laws rule in the
average case.40
28 "There is no federal general common law," said Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, supra, n. 18, 78. For probable qualifications
of this statement see McCormick and Hewins, supra, n. 27, 142.
37 "For the Supreme Court would hardly require the federal courts to
follow a local decision which, had it been appealed, would have been re-
versed by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds." (Sampson v.
Channell, supra, n. 7, 759). So, in the Klaxon case it was argued (unsuc-
cessfully) that the state courts of Delaware would be compelled to give
effect to Section 480 of the New York Civil Practice Act, supra, n. 3, under
the full faith and credit clause. A similar argument of unconstitutionality
of a conflict of laws rule applying Texas law or policy to out-of-state in-
surance was answered in Griffin v. McCoach. See cases cited supra, n. 17.
8 Supra, n. 35.
29 For a discussion of the desirability of uniformity in the field of conflict
of laws, see Dodd, supra, n. 35, 560; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of
Law Problem (1933) 47 Harv. L. R. 173, 199; note (1939) 52 Harv. L. 11.
1002, 1007.
10 See Supra, n. 37. For more exhaustive treatment of the problems of
the cases noted herein, see Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of
Laws (1942) 36 Ill. L. Rev. 493; and Note, Application by Federal Court8
of State Rules on Conflict of Laws (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 1403.
[VOL. VI166
